took the Government into the world of business and commerce and led to the emergence of important relationships between particular entrepreneurs and the Government. …[A] type of system emerged in which support and money passed from the Government to business and, at the same time, healthy donations found their way into the coffers of the ALP. …What proved to be controversial and debatable about this system was the interpenetration of private and public interests. As the two sectors became linked, it was inevitable that questions would be asked about conflicts of interest and the potential for corruption, of process if not of persons. 9 In the 1990s, according to Gallop, the political landscape changed in response to the risks posed by the 1980s style of government. It seems that during the 1990s there was a change in perspective as government sought to distance itself as much as possible from business by privatising government business enterprises and contracting-out services. But similar problems emerged:
[N]ew and powerful partnerships develop between government and business. Failure of government to renew contracts can become fatal and support from government, including ministers, becomes crucial. Although the theory has government in charge, the practice may very well see governments adjusting and responding to the needs of its private contractors, some of whom may be party benefactors. 10 When companies make political donations they may expect to receive a sympathetic hearing on issues affecting them from the leaders of the political party and would hope for favourable treatment. 11 Public choice theory may provide insights into not only such arguments but also the issue of corporate political donations more generally. Public choice theory views government and law-making as part of a market:
On the demand side, legal rules are the outcome of political struggle among special interest groups to redistribute wealth in their favour, while on the supply side, they reflect the effort of politicians to maximise the political support they receive from interest groups' constituencies. That is, laws are supplied to those interest groups (or coalitions) that out-bid rivals for favourable legislation…On the supply side, the fee may take the form of campaign contributions. 12 However, there are limits on the extent to which political influence can be purchased. Legislative decision-making is majoritarian and, in addition, 'there is as yet no consensus on the appropriate model of how money maps into votes '. 13 This article begins by examining some of the more recent and topical responses to the phenomenon of corporate political donations. It then examines the motivations which apparently underpin corporate giving. While this is largely informed by American literature on charitable donations, some peculiarly Australian differences are
Ibid 81-2, referring to Royal Commission into Commercial Activities of Government and Other Matters: Report (1992) .
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183 ____________________________________________________________________________________ of the company'. 22 In March 1999, the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) issued a consultative document titled Political Donations by Companies. 23 In the same vein as the Neill Report, the DTI paper observed:
In recent years there has been growing concern about directors' accountability to shareholders in relation to political donations by companies. This concern is due in part to the scope for conflict between a director's personal wishes or interests and his [or her] duty to the company. Moreover, the Companies Act, by requiring all donations in excess of £200 to be declared in the directors' report and the recipients identified, already recognises that even small political donations may cause justifiable concern to shareholders and cannot be treated as routine business expenditure. The very low threshold for disclosure suggests that the key issue is not whether the sums are material to the company's finances but whether the donation is in the company's interest. 24 In the DTI paper, the UK government accepted the recommendations in the Neill Report that companies should be required to obtain prior shareholder approval to make any type of donation or provide any form of financial benefit to a political party or organisation. 25 The government also indicated its intention to amend the Companies Act 1985 (UK) to require companies to disclose annually in the directors' report all forms of financial benefit -direct or indirect -to political parties. 26 These proposals have been enacted as ss 139 and 140 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (UK) . In addition, the UK government sought comments on the possibility of requiring a director to disclose in the directors' report any connection with a political party that might give rise either to a conflict of interest or to the perception of a conflict of interest. 27 The motivation for a shareholder approval requirement seems to stem from a recognition that shareholders can often do little to rectify conflicts of interest, especially after they have become apparent. 28 The suggestion seems to be that, due to the limited avenues of redress, the least that can be done (and at relatively low cost) is to require companies to make prior disclosure so that shareholders at least have the opportunity to make an informed decision when exercising their voting rights, 29 and even in evaluating their investment decision before they agree to become shareholders. These and other reforms are evaluated more fully later in this article. Ibid.
24
Ibid para 1.2.
25
Ibid paras 2.6, 3.7, 4.18; Neill Report, above n 21, Recommendation 34.
26
Department of Trade and Industry, Political Donations by Companies: A Consultative Document (1999) (URN 99/757; "http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/condocs.htm "), paras 2.6, 5.9.
27
Ibid para 5.10.
28
Neill Report, above n 21, para 6.29.
29
Ibid para 6.35.
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B. Australia
In Australia, there is no single legislative provision governing corporate political donations. 30 The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) contains no provision dealing expressly with donations, although s 19(a) of the old 'uniform' Companies Acts gave companies power 'to make donations for patriotic or for charitable purposes'. 31 The legal regime currently applying to corporate political donations in Australia is discussed in detail in Section IV below. The remainder of this section outlines reform proposals that have been made in Australia recently.
Current Bill
There is currently before the Commonwealth Parliament the Taxation Laws Amendment (Political Donations) Bill 1999. This Bill was reintroduced after lapsing at the last prorogation of the Parliament on the calling of the 1998 election. The purpose of the Bill is to amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth):
• to increase the current deductibility limit for donations from $100 per annum to $1,500 per annum; and • to extend deductibility to corporations. 32 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill infers that it is desirable that companies now have access to a deductibility regime for political donations. 33 The Bill was introduced in response to a report by the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) on the 1996 federal election. 34 The Digest to the Bill explains that the Liberal Party proposed a deductibility limit of $10,000, while the ALP submitted that the limit should be $1,500. Both parties, it seems, were prepared to endorse the following view of the JSCEM:
For discussion of the history of the regulation of political campaign financing in Australia, see Deborah Cass and Sonia Burrows, 'Commonwealth Regulation of Campaign FinancePublic Funding, Disclosure and Expenditure Limits ' (2000) 
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185 ____________________________________________________________________________________ An increase in the maximum deduction would encourage small to medium donations, thereby increasing the number of Australians involved in the democratic process and decreasing the parties' reliance on a smaller number of large donations. 35 However, the findings presented later in this article do not reveal any need to increase the number of small and medium donations -at least as far as corporate donations are concerned. Our empirical study shows that there are already significant numbers of these smaller donations (particularly from corporations). Therefore, the absence of a significant deductibility regime appears not to have been an impediment to corporate political philanthropy. Indeed, the Digest to the Bill notes that deductibility probably makes no difference to the decision to donate. Perhaps the raising of the deductibility limit and its extension to corporations is intended to encourage current donors to maintain (or even increase) their levels of giving.
Wider concerns
The Australian Financial Review reported in a February 1999 editorial that 'the release of the latest political donations by the Australian Electoral Commission has once again highlighted the major deficiencies that exist in our funding disclosure law '. 36 Specifically, the concern was with political parties which relied on 'associated entities' to make donations en masse on behalf of benefactors who wished to remain anonymous.
The issue raised in the editorial is one of transparency, both in terms of representative government in a democracy and in terms of shareholder dominion in widely held companies. The underlying concern is that corporate donors wishing to remain anonymous do so either because they wish to avoid the perception that they are buying government influence, or because they wish to avoid alerting their shareholders that they are giving away company property, particularly where the gift is of doubtful benefit to the company's shareholders.
The Australian Democrats' proposals
In 2000 the Australian Democrats' Accountability spokesperson, Senator Andrew Murray, outlined reform proposals:
• to require shareholder approval of 'donation policies' of public companies; and • to require 'full donations disclosure' in a public company's annual report. 37 The proposals are in line with the recent UK changes discussed above. The second proposal is unsurprising given that a major Australian bank -a publicly listed company -forgave a large loan (overdraft balance) to an Australian political party after the 1996 federal election, without disclosure. The nature of the financial benefit (forgiving a loan) meant that no disclosure was considered necessary under the rules in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth). 38 However, for a financial benefit of this magnitude to be given to a political party without any form of disclosure certainly Australian Democrats, above n 1.
38
Disclosure was made at a later stage, after an Electoral Commission audit: see below n 120.
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Senator Brown's proposal
Australian Greens Senator for Tasmania, Bob Brown, has recently referred to corporate political donations as 'a growing wave of corporate largesse that is eating at the fabric of [Australia's] democracy [and] a cancer that must be cut out'. 39 Senator Brown has recommended that:
• corporate donations to political parties should be banned; and • donations should instead be diverted into a 'Democracy Trust Fund' to be distributed to political parties according to their relative electoral success. 40 We return to options for law reform in Section VI below. The article now examines what motivates companies to donate corporate funds to political parties.
III. MOTIVATIONS FOR GIVING
The use of corporate funds for philanthropic purposes is, in some circumstances, an agency cost of running a company. The concept of agency costs in the corporate context goes back at least as far as Adam Smith. 41 Agency costs arise where a party (the shareholders of a company) appoints another party (the directors) to be its delegate or agent in a particular transaction or series of transactions (overseeing the management of the company's business). As Berle and Means observed in relation to the typical widely held US company 70 years ago:
In the corporate system, the 'owner' of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control. 42
Agency costs arise where the interests of the principal and the agent (or shareholders and directors) diverge:
As residual claimants on the firm's income stream, shareholders want their agents -the firm's managers -to maximize wealth. Because managers cannot capture all of the gains if they are successful, and will not suffer all of the losses should the venture flop, they have less incentive to maximize wealth than if they themselves were the principals. Rather, managers have an incentive to consume excess leisure, perquisites and in general be less dedicated to the goal of wealth maximization than they would if they were not simply agents. 43 When managers use company funds other than in the direct course of the company's business, there may be a divergence of interests between ownership and management: A key aim of corporate governance mechanisms is to minimise the divergences between owners' and managers' interests, and hence minimise agency costs. 45 On the other hand, as discussed below, a corporate donation may be approved by directors/managers with a view to increasing shareholder wealth. 46 In this situation there is no agency cost problem in the traditional sense, although -depending on the circumstances -there may be other legal issues to contend with. Therefore, whether a donation gives rise to agency costs depends largely on its motive, a question we now turn to examine.
A.
Altruism US companies are more or less prohibited from making overt political contributions. 47 It is thought that 'unrestrained corporate campaign spending would pose a substantial threat to the democratic political process, and create at least the appearance of unseemly political quid pro quos'. 48 However, this has not prevented US corporations from 'pursuing political objectives through technically philanthropic contributions, [so as to] lawfully avoid the limitations and disincentives pertaining to traditional corporate political advocacy'. 49 The ability of US companies to support political parties in this indirect manner is bolstered by the absence of a 'benefit-to-the-company' test for corporate philanthropy (at least in many states).
The position in many US states 'accords substantial deference to management's judgment. The fact that a perceived benefit is intangible, non-economic, or uncertain will not invalidate a corporate expenditure'. 50 The 'benefit-to-the-business' test (under which a use of corporate funds is valid only if it benefits the company, at least indirectly) seems to have been abrogated by statute in several states. An example is the Californian Corporation Code, s 207(e), which provides authority for charitable donations 'regardless of specific corporate benefit'. Other states limit corporate philanthropy by still adhering to the benefit-to-the-business test, while a large number of states allow corporate contributions for wider purposes either without imposing any express _____________________________________________________________________________________ 44 Kahn, above n 15, 610 (emphasis added).
45
An interesting question, at least for American corporate governance scholars, is the extent to which agency costs arising in this area can be minimised in a jurisdiction whose statutory regime unreservedly confers on company controllers the power to make donations: '[i]n affording them full decisional authority in regard to corporate contributions, these laws have conferred extraordinary power and discretion on corporate managers': Kahn, ibid, 603-4 (notes omitted).
46
See Section IIIE below.
47
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 , 2 USC 431-455 (1994 . See Kahn, above n 15, notes 246-63 and accompanying text.
48
Kahn, ibid, 642.
49
Ibid 640-1.
50
Fisch, above n 4, 1096, referring to Levine v Smith 591 A 2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991) , and the US common law business judgment rule, which creates a presumption of validity for business decisions made by directors where they act without self-interest, on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
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Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ limitations or without expressly waiving the benefit-to-the-business requirement. 51 Accordingly, in regard to corporate charitable donations, US managers have considerable discretion to choose their beneficiaries, and are permitted to be altruistically motivated, so long as their largesse is not politically inclined. Nevertheless, as Abzug and Webb have observed, rarely are gifts made by US companies seen to be completely altruistic or completely in the interest of society; rather, they are often thought to be beneficial to others, but still in the interests of the corporation:
Although possible, it is unlikely that corporate executives are completely altruistic. In addition to the benefit that society receives from a donation, the corporation nearly always benefits from the added goodwill it creates, even if the donation is not highly publicized. 52 Australian corporate directors and managers are not permitted to be as altruistic as their US counterparts. In effect, what the Americans call the benefit-to-the-business test applies in Australia. As Bowen LJ stated in Hutton's case (an English decision):
They can only spend money which is…the company's, if they are spending it for the purposes which are reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the business of the company. … The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company. … It is not charity sitting at the board of directors, because as it seems to me charity has no business to sit at boards of directors qua charity. There is, however, a kind of charitable dealing which is for the interest of those who practise it, and to that extent and in that garb (I admit not a very philanthropic garb) charity may sit at the board, but for no other purpose. 53 Hutton was decided on corporate capacity grounds; the payment in question was alleged, and found, to have been made ultra vires (beyond the company's powers). In Parke v Daily News Ltd 54 -a later English decision which applied Hutton -Plowman J based his judgment not only on the doctrine of ultra vires, but also on directors' duties grounds. 55 Given the abolition of the ultra vires doctrine in Australia, 56 the relevant legal doctrine is officers' duties -in particular, the general law duty of directors and senior executives to act in good faith in the interests of the company, and the duty of directors and other officers under s 181 of the Corporations Act to exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith in the best interests of the corporation.
In summary, sheer altruism (however laudable) would not provide a sufficient legal basis for corporate giving in Australia. The likelihood of a corporate donation being motivated purely by altruism is, however, unlikely. Any political donation that is intended to benefit the company, even indirectly, cannot be charitable in the strict _____________________________________________________________________________________
51
For an overview of the legal regulation of corporate charitable donations in the US, see R Franklin Balotti and James J Franks, 'Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable Contributions by Corporations ' (1999) sense. It appears likely that altruism would often only be a co-motivation to other, more-tangible motivations. Before turning to profit-maximisation (shareholder benefit) as a motivation for corporate giving, we address several other possible motives.
B.
Management self-promotion or self-dealing As noted above, corporate donations (to charities or political parties) may involve agency costs. In some cases, corporate charitable donations may be 'a form of selfaggrandising or self-promoting behaviour by management'. 57 Abzug and Webb speculate that '[m]anagers may give [company funds to charity] because they…enjoy the prestige associated with being a big giver. … " [B] usiness contributions…are attempts to acquire status, prestige, and goodwill for management and the firm"'. 58 On the other hand, shareholders might take the view that a little philanthropic dealing by managers is indirectly good for the company. That is, if managers are pleased with the prestige that philanthropy attracts, there may in turn be a positive effect on the managers' productivity, and higher gains for shareholders. 59 Turning from charitable donations to political donations, it is possible that political donations may be explained by managerial self-dealing. 60 If a manager were to contribute company funds to a political party solely for personal satisfaction, this would be open to question even in the more liberal donations regime existing in many US states:
[C]orporate managers may authorize donations to politically active charities as a means of furthering their own political and ideological preferences, irrespective of the firm's best interests. When corporate managers approve donations on this self-serving basis, they satisfy the letter of the [US] law, but fail to fulfill their fiduciary obligation to protect corporate shareholders' property interests. 61 Under Australian corporate law, directors and senior executives must not profit improperly from their position as officers of the company. 62 A political donation could lead to a breach of this rule if, as a result of a donation, a director was endorsed as a party candidate. As the DTI paper notes, where a director 'was a member of the political party to which a donation was to be given, there could be a conflict between the director's personal interests and [her or] his duty to the company'. 63 Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving (1985) , 184.
60
The data examined in the study described later in this article do not enable any definite conclusions to be drawn. A more detailed study examining the most mobile directors amongst the most politically philanthropic companies would shed more light on this point. Directors who were constantly changing companies would be examined to see whether they took their 'giving-pattern' with them.
61
Kahn, above n 15, 611 (notes omitted). 
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Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Managerial self-dealing may explain a company's political donations even where no director or senior executive of the company is actively involved in the political party concerned. The donations may result simply from a personal desire among some or all of the directors to assist a particular party. If they were to use their own money this would be completely uncontentious. But where this desire to provide financial support to a political party results in company funds being donated to the political party or a club or foundation supporting the party -or in some other form of financial assistance being given by the company to the political party -matters of corporate law and policy become relevant.
C.
Corporate social responsibility There is no universally accepted definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR), 64 but Engel has said:
The term…is most useful if taken to denote the obligations and inclinations, if any, of corporations organized for profit, voluntarily to pursue social ends that conflict with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit. 65 CSR is probably interchangeable with terms like 'enlightened self-interest' 66 and the corporate governance perspective known generally as 'stakeholder theory'. 67 The fundamental theme of CSR is that corporate managers should recognise that their prime duty of profit-maximisation for shareholders is to be tempered by an acknowledgement that corporate power is held on trust for the wider community. 68 This approach seems to have been accepted by some US courts. 69 In terms of philanthropy, some corporate executives say that supporting philanthropic agencies is a way for the company to 'give something back' to the community. 70 Unlike a purely altruistic perspective, however, CSR-prompted charity recognises that the corporation does not exist in a social, ethical or moral vacuum. 71 In fact, the term 'enlightened self-interest' best captures the notion that the CSR-aware company is far from altruistic, and indeed recognises that by being good, it can do well. It could be argued that CSR is simply profit-maximisation with a halo:
Kahn, above n 15, 629 (note 191).
65
David L Engel, 'An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility ' (1979) Although researchers in economics, sociology, and other fields suggest that social responsibility or duty motivates corporate executives to donate, economists tend to believe that nearly all donations benefit the corporation in some way. …The benefit to the firm is increased sales or other benefits accruing because the corporation appears to be 'socially minded '. 72 Some of those other benefits include public relations, financial performance and employee productivity. 73 Abzug and Webb note that, in the US, no studies have conclusively proven causation between higher levels of giving and better financial performance. 74 From the US perspective, this would be of little consequence. 75 But the Australian position, based on Hutton 76 , seems to be that if CSR-prompted charity is of no benefit to the company, then the courts can impeach such contributions. This is precisely the situation that arose in Parke v Daily News Ltd. 77 A minority shareholder challenged proposed ex gratia payments to employees who were facing imminent redundancy as the company had contracted to sell its main business assets. The board considered that it owed 'a very practical obligation to employees', but the court disagreed: 'the defendants were prompted by motives which, however laudable, and however enlightened from the point of view of industrial relations, were such as the law does not recognise as a sufficient justification'. 78 Whatever the relative merits and demerits of CSR, it is doubtful whether it can justify the making of political donations. Political parties are hardly the kind of social actors whose interests are furthered by CSR and, moreover, often represent only narrow sectional political interests. Although CSR masquerading as 'enlightened selfinterest' could serve to validate a political donation under the strict 'benefit' test, the more appropriate rationalisation would appear to be profit-maximisation.
D.
Political free-speech Another possible motivation for a corporate political donation is a desire by a company's board or management to voice the company's view in a political debatealbeit indirectly. There would, of course, often be other (more direct) means of making 
75
US managers who operate in a legal environment that has not abrogated the 'benefit-to-thebusiness' test will still enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule where, in making a donation, they acted on an informed basis, honestly, and in good faith, and the donation was a business decision in the best interests of the company. If today the directors of a company were to consider the interests of its employees no one would argue that in doing so they were not acting bona fide in the interests of the company itself. Similarly, if the directors were to consider the consequences to the community of any policy that the company intended to pursue, and were deflected in their commitment to that policy as a result, it could not be said that they had not considered bona fide the interests of the shareholders.
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Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ the company's view known; for example, by making a formal submission to a parliamentary committee or law reform body. To the extent that a corporate political donation represents an attempt by the company's board or management to exercise the company's right to 'political free-speech', Kahn is strongly opposed:
[B]ecause politicized corporate charitable contributions are a form of corporate political speech, they may impinge on shareholders' speech and associational interests. In light of the fact that shareholders are typically not provided with information regarding the firm's charitable contributions, the investment decision cannot represent a legitimate proxy for shareholder consent to politicized charitable contributions. …[A] deep conflict exists between the firm's right to promote its political interests and the shareholders' interest in not being compelled to subsidize speech with which they are in disagreement. 79
E.
Profit-maximisation By definition, pure charity cannot be expected to result in gains for a company because, where 'charity' is used in the true sense of the word, the donor cannot anticipate a net gain from his or her contribution. 80 There is therefore a widely held view that corporate donations to charitable organisations are motivated primarily by profit-maximisation. 81 As Adams and Hardwick argue, 'more and more corporations view their contributions as a form of investment rather than classic philanthropy (ie: pure gifts)'. 82 Corporate donations to political parties may also be motivated by profitmaximisation. The link between the political contribution and the benefit to the business may well be direct and obvious; it may be designed to reduce costs or increase revenues in a fairly direct manner. As far as reducing costs is concerned, contributions could be designed to insulate the company from unfavourable tax or regulatory policies, thereby reducing the company's tax and compliance costs. 83 As for increasing revenues, contributions may be designed to improve the company's chances of winning government business contracts when the political party, which is the beneficiary, next forms a government.
Alternatively, the link between the contribution and the benefit to the business may be more indirect. An example of a contribution designed to maximise profits indirectly is a contribution aimed at minimising or negating adverse publicity:
Managers also use contributions to stem governmental criticisms of corporate actions, and to ward off attacks by social activists. …[T]hreats of regulation prompt contributions to civic and political affairs from the utilities. 84 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 79 Kahn, above n 15, 637 (notes omitted).
80
Ibid, 663-4 (notes omitted).
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Abzug and Webb, above n 52, 1045. From the shareholders' perspective, political donations motivated primarily by profit-maximisation are not a source of agency costs. If the company is offered contracts or tenders when its beneficiary obtains government, or is approached more sympathetically by regulators, then many shareholders would have little cause for complaint. On the other hand, political donations of this nature may involve some significant legal and policy issues in areas other than corporate law.
F.
The (lack of) evidence on motivation Much of the preceding argument is speculative in the sense that it is almost impossible accurately to discern why companies make donations. Suspicions can be loosely tested by reference to the contours of the corporate landscape and tax laws, but in the absence of a study directly on point no solid conclusions can be reached.
A 1980 study considered some motivations, but it did not differentiate between political and non-political donations. 85 Of the 101 companies responding to the survey, 96 made donations. The most important factor cited by respondents was a belief in the active support of social programs. The fact that donations provided favourable publicity was mostly claimed to be unimportant. Of the five companies which did not make donations, four refrained because their basic responsibility was to shareholders, while the fact that benefits to the company might not be readily identifiable was claimed to be largely unimportant. Unfortunately, the findings of this study are, for present purposes, largely indeterminate because it did not differentiate between political and non-political donations. Also, the results of surveys in this area must be treated with caution given the possibility of self-serving responses.
The possibility that corporate giving is motivated more by management selfinterest (or other factors) rather than profit-maximisation is supported by studies that fail to find a conclusive link between corporate giving and profitability. 86 However, the failure to find that conclusive link is not necessarily fatal to the proposition.
There is some old UK evidence suggesting that corporate political donations make no difference to election outcomes. 87 If this remains the case -that is, if contributions make no difference to a party's chances -then a donor company's directors are possibly in breach of the rule in Hutton. 88 If contributions do make a difference, then the rule in Hutton is observed, but at the risk of an accusation of buying political influence. 89 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
88
If the party is already in government, the donation would not run as great a risk of leading to a breach of the rule in Hutton. This is because the donation may be designed to influence the government's approach to laws and issues affecting the company, and therefore could be 'profit-maximising'. However, a donation of this nature raises issues over and above corporate law.
89
Ewing, above n 87, 71.
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In relation to the US, causal empiricism suggests that political spending is positively related to election outcomes. The restriction on overt political contributions by US companies 90 inferentially recognises this and the concomitant point that votes can be bought.
The importance of the effect of a contribution -and the motive for making itcannot be underestimated. Depending on the effect or motive (and it does not seem to matter which), directors and senior executives expose themselves (and their companies) to varying types and degrees of liability. We now consider these legal issues.
IV. LEGAL REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA
A.
Corporate law
Disclosure
The Corporations Act does not contain any disclosure rules specifically aimed at political donations. But a proposed corporate political donation may fall within a general disclosure rule.
If a director has a material personal interest in a proposed political donation by the company, the director must disclose to the other directors as soon as practicable the nature and extent of the interest and the relation of the interest to the affairs of the company. 91 If it is a public company, the interested director is not allowed to be present while the donation is being considered by the board, and is not allowed to vote on the matter at the board meeting. 92 Also, if the company is a public company or is controlled by a public company, the related party provisions apply. Under Chapter 2E of the Corporations Act, a public company (or an entity that the public company controls) may give a financial benefit to a 'related party' of the public company only if:
• the public company's shareholders approve in advance -after full disclosure; or • the giving of the benefit falls within an exception set out in Chapter 2E. The expression 'related party' is defined to include not only the directors of the public company, and their spouses, parents and children, but also (among others) an entity which acts in concert with a related party (X) on the understanding that X will receive a financial benefit if the public company gives the entity a financial benefit. 93 If a public-company director is also an office-bearer of a political party, or has some involvement with an organisation that supports a political party, any financial benefit given by the company to the party or the supporting organisation would fall within Chapter 2E if the 'acting in concert' test was satisfied. Giving a financial benefit is defined very broadly and would catch not only straightforward donations but also, for example, supplying services, forgiving a loan or leasing property to the political party or supporting organisation. 94 If an exception applies, there is no obligation to obtain prior shareholder approval of the financial benefit. But in the political donations scenario the only exception that might be applicable is the 'arm's length terms' exception. This exception applies where a financial benefit is given on terms that would be reasonable in the circumstances if the public company (or controlled entity) and the related party were dealing at arm's length (or on terms that are less favourable to the related party than arm's length terms). 95 If one accepts that regulations governing corporate political donations should be based on the two principles of transparency and accountability, the related party provisions provide a sub-optimal disclosure and approval regime. There is no doubt that the Chapter 2E provisions are very broadly drafted. Indeed, the provisions may well have applied to some cases of corporate political giving over recent years, although neither the directors nor the political party concerned (nor the Australian Securities and Investments Commission) were aware of their applicability. Nevertheless, in some instances a public company could provide a financial benefit to a political party, or an organisation supporting a political party, and Chapter 2E would not apply due to the absence of a 'related party'. And, of course, Chapter 2E applies only to financial benefits given by public companies and entities controlled by public companies. It does not apply to financial benefits given by a proprietary company that is not controlled by a public company. In short, Chapter 2E is not a comprehensive disclosure regime as far as corporate political donations are concerned.
Corporate capacity and officers' authority 96
In the UK, the question of a company's capacity to make a political donation arose in Simmonds v Heffer. 97 Mervyn-Davies J considered that the legal capacity of a company to make a donation depended on construing its memorandum and articles of association, and determining whether or not the donation was ultra vires the company. But because the doctrine of ultra vires has been abolished in Australia, 98 As s 125(2) of the Corporations Act states, 'An act of [a] company is not invalid merely because it is contrary to or beyond the objects in the company's constitution'. Although the expression ultra vires is sometimes used in respect of acts of both individuals or corporations who act beyond their powers, in the context of corporate law, the expression should be used in the narrow sense of being confined to acts by a company with limited capacity beyond its corporate power. With the abolition of the doctrine of ultra vires in
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Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ One possible ground for challenging a political donation made by an Australian company is lack of authority in the officer(s) who approved and/or performed the acts constituting the donation. This is a matter for the general law of agency as it has been applied to companies 100 and the statutory assumptions 101 which a donee is entitled to make in relation to the contribution.
As a practical matter, however, it would be unlikely that a political party would try to challenge the ability of its benefactor to make donations to it. It is therefore more useful to analyse a political donation in terms of officers' duties, 102 and any actions which may be brought to enforce those duties.
Directors' and officers' duties
As discussed earlier in the article, a director or senior executive risks breaching the duty to act in good faith in the interests of the company if he or she authorises a political donation in circumstances where there is no obvious benefit -direct or indirect -for the company's shareholders. 103 In addition, if a director or senior executive authorises a political donation in circumstances where he or she stands to gain personally -either directly or indirectly -then there is a risk of breaching the fiduciary duty to avoid a conflict between personal interests and duties to the company, and also the statutory duty not to make improper use of position. 104 These duties may be enforced by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), 105 by the company itself 106 An action by ASIC is probably unlikely except in extreme circumstances, given ASIC's limited resources and wide range of competing demands on its enforcement arm. It is also unlikely that the company would bring legal proceedings -unless there has been a change of control. This is particularly the case where the decision to make a political donation is a 'collective' decision made by the board of directors because the power to commence litigation in the company's name is ordinarily a power of the board of directors. 108 A derivative action by a shareholder in respect of a political donation authorised by the board is also considered unlikely except in extreme circumstances. The incentives for this type of shareholder litigation are particularly weak. 109 Also, a derivative action could commence only if, among other things, the court considered the alleged breach of duty arising from the political donation as sufficiently serious that it was in the best interests of the company that a derivative action be allowed to proceed. 110
Oppression
Political donations may form the basis of an oppression application under Part 2F.1 of the Corporations Act. Under Part 2F.1, any member of a company 111 has power to apply to the court for an order under s 233 in respect of an act, omission or course of conduct that is contrary to the interests of the company's members as a whole, or oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.
While there has been no reported oppression case in Australia in which the applicant has cited political donations among the allegedly oppressive acts or conduct, the nature of the oppression remedy is such that the possibility of this occurring in the future cannot be ruled out. For example, a member of a small or medium-sized company may build an oppression application around the fact that the company's directors have decided not to pay dividends but instead to donate heavily to a political party. This example reveals a significant limitation of the oppression remedy for present purposes: the oppression provisions have greater scope for application to proprietary companies than to large public companies. 112 _____________________________________________________________________________________ more of the statutory officers' duties. 
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Court-ordered winding up
Under s 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act, the court has power to order the winding up of a company if the court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company be wound up. A shareholder has standing to apply for a winding up order on this ground. 113 Sections 461(1)(f) and 461(1)(g) provide further grounds on which the court may make a winding up order following a shareholder application -namely, that the affairs of the company are being conducted in an oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory manner, or that an act or omission by or on behalf of the company is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory.
An additional ground for a court-ordered winding up is set out in s 461(1)(e) -namely, where a company's directors have acted in the affairs of the company in their own interests rather than in the interests of the members as a whole, or in some other way that appears to be unfair or unjust to members.
In practical terms, a member aggrieved by a company's political donations would be better advised to apply for an order under the oppression provisions (Part 2F.1) rather than a winding up order under s 461. This is because compulsory winding up is a drastic remedy, and under s 467(4) the court is required to refrain from making a winding up order on the grounds set out in s 461(1)(e) or (k) if the court believes that some other remedy is available to the applicant and the applicant is acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of pursuing that other remedy. Presumably, the court may well consider that a remedy under the oppression provisions is an acceptable alternative. These remedies include an order for the purchase of the applicant's shares by the company or by another shareholder, or an order prohibiting the payment of further donations.
B.
The Electoral Act The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) ('Electoral Act') regulates the practice of donations only by requiring disclosure. The Electoral Act does no more than establish a scheme of annual reporting and disclosure to the Australian Electoral Commission by:
• registered political parties of funds they have received (including donations); and • individuals, companies, trusts and foundations of donations they have made to registered political parties. The details of disclosure in each case are not the same. Political parties are required to disclose all amounts they receive during a financial year (including donations, loans and bequests) from a person or organisation where the sum of all amounts received from that person or organisation during the financial year is $1,500 or more. In calculating the sum, an amount of less than $1,500 need not be counted. 114 Disclosure must also be made by candidates in an election or by-election of donations they have received relating to the election. 115 A person or organisation which donates $1,500 or more to a registered political party during a financial year must provide a return to the Electoral Commission disclosing all donations within 20 weeks after the end of the financial year. Donations 
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199 ____________________________________________________________________________________ made by individuals, companies, trusts and foundations must be disclosed. There have been concerns that the Electoral Act did not require disclosures made indirectly through a trust or foundation. For example, a public company could donate funds to a trust or foundation and if that trust or foundation then used those funds to make a donation to a political party, the source of the original donation (the public company) would not have to be disclosed. This concern has now been addressed. As a result of amendments made by the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act (No 1) 1999 (Cth), the return lodged by a person or organisation which specifies the donations made to a political party must also include details of all donations received by that person or organisation, being donations used to make the donation to the political party. 116 These amendments also require loans made to political parties to be disclosed.
The set of donation records maintained by the Australian Electoral Commission are somewhat unworkable. The records do not neatly differentiate 'Donations to XYZ Party made by corporations'. This is because the Electoral Act does not differentiate between corporate and non-corporate donors. Also, it does not require the Australian Electoral Commission to consolidate into one report all the State Branch returns from a particular party. Weaknesses in the disclosure scheme are addressed later in this article.
By comparison, the Companies Act 1985 (UK), as amended by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (UK)
, imposes very specific disclosure requirements upon companies. The current UK disclosure regime makes it more difficult for UK companies to conceal political donations than is the case for Australian companies. The Australian Corporations Act contains no specific disclosure rules.
V. THE STUDY
A. Collecting, categorising and consolidating the data The data collected for the study was derived from party annual returns for 1995/96, 1996/97 and 1997/98 . Research was confined to the major parties in Australian politics -the Australian Labor Party, the Liberal Party, the National Party, the Democrats, the Greens 117 and One Nation. Because the returns are not restricted to donations, it seems to make more sense to collect data directly from the donor returns, but these are far more numerous and presented significant logistical and analytical problems which could not be as easily overcome as those presented by the party annual returns. Accordingly, data was collected from the party annual returns for ease of later analysis.
The use of annual returns as the data source necessitated some qualitative refinements to the extracted information to confine the data to corporate donations. In _____________________________________________________________________________________ 116 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, s 305B(3A) . The precise requirement is as follows:
The return must also set out the relevant details of all gifts received by the person at any time, being gifts used to make gifts the whole or part of which were used to make gifts totalling $1,500 or more in a financial year to the same registered political party or the same State branch of a registered political party and the amount or value of each of which is equal to or exceeds $1,000. 117 There are many registered parties going by the name 'Green' or some derivative of that word. We consolidated these parties under the 'Green' banner for convenience.
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Federal Law Review Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ the main, the parties split their annual receipts into gifts and other receipts. In these cases, refinement consisted simply of culling the non-corporate donors from the data.
Once the set of corporate donors was obtained, these were separated into public and proprietary companies. Non-corporate enterprises were culled, but we preserved the data on professional firms 118 and lobby groups for comparative purposes. 119 The next step in the analysis involved consolidating and verifying the data. Where a public company was seen to have made several donations to a party (say, by way of a donation to each state branch of the party), the donations were consolidated under the banner name of that company. Also, donations were -to a limited extentconsolidated according to corporate groups. Where a donation was made by a similarly named subsidiary of a public company, it was consolidated under the parent company's name. However, no attempt was made to consolidate donations made by group companies, which were operating under markedly different names. To have attempted to consolidate in this comprehensive manner would have necessitated an enormous amount of time cross-checking company names against either a database of corporate group constituents or disclosures of subsidiaries in public companies' annual reports.
Very little consolidation according to corporate groups was carried out for proprietary companies. The reason is that the sheer number of proprietary companies in existence means that similarities in name may be coincidental rather than evidence of a group relationship. Again, verification would have involved a very substantial exercise.
Where the party return was ambiguous or unclear, a number of databases were used to resolve difficulties over entity type or consolidation. In some cases, the donor's address (taken from the return) matched the address which was returned by ASIC's website search facility, the White Pages or the Yellow Pages. However, addresses are not conclusive because several unrelated companies may share the same registered office (eg, that of their mutual accountant). So, in the case of uncertainty, reference was made to the Australian Financial Review's Shareholder guidebook and Dun & Bradstreet's Who Owns Whom, to settle questions of consolidation.
Public companies were separated into ASX-listed companies and unlisted companies. The listed companies were then classified according to ASX industry groups. This allowed a comparison of the patterns of corporate giving by industry group over the three years of the study.
Given the inconsistencies and flaws in the raw data, the conclusions that may be drawn from this research must necessarily be qualified to some extent. This raises a separate issue. The problems with the database produced under the current disclosure regime highlight the desirability of reforming the existing disclosure rules so that comprehensible and meaningful information is disclosed in the future. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 118 'Professional firms' were those donors that were found to be law firms, barristers' clerking offices and accounting firms. 119 A broad definition of 'lobby group' was adopted because it was considered inappropriate to include some corporate donors in the corporate listings, if in substance the company was a lobby group. In general, lobby groups were those donors that were companies limited by guarantee, or bore the title 'Association', 'Club', 'Federation' or 'Group', but not trade unions.
ASX-listed companies
The pattern of giving by ASX-listed companies is presented in Table B . The data has been totalled over the three years of the study, and is confined to the three major parties that received significant levels of donations. The industry groups shown in Table B are those industry groups represented in the data -not all industry groups were represented. Each party's data can be read and interpreted independently of the data of another party. The overall pattern of giving may be discerned from the three columns following the 'Industry sector' column. The 'Total donated' column represents the total amount in dollars donated to the three parties by the corresponding industry sector. The 'Number of companies' column, however, does not reflect the total number of donations made by the corresponding industry sector. Rather, this column indicates how many companies in a given sector made donations to any combination of parties. For example, in the Gold sector, 24 companies made donations -22 to the Liberal Party and 3 each to the ALP and the National Party. Adding up each party's number of benefactors would give 28, which would be incorrect because several companies made
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203 ____________________________________________________________________________________ donations to more than one party. Accordingly, the figure in the 'Number of companies' column avoids double-counting of donors. Finally, the 'Average aggregate overall donation' column is simply the result obtained by dividing 'Total donated' by 'Number of companies'. This aggregate figure represents the average amount which companies in a given industry sector set aside for donations to any destination; where this figure is higher than the averages received by a particular party, it can be concluded that companies in a given sector have donated to more than one party.
Tables C and D are derived from Table B , and are more amenable to descriptive analysis. Table C ranks the industry sectors in descending order of total donations per sector. It can be seen that the industry sector with the most donations was the banking and finance sector with almost $3 million in total donations over the 3 year period. This was followed by the tourism and leisure sector with $1.7 million in total donations, the developers and contractors sector with $1.44 million in total donations and the diversified industrial sector with $1.05 million in total donations. The average amount donated by all companies within an industry sector was $686,040 which fell between ranks 8 and 9.
Table D ranks the industry sectors in descending order of average aggregate overall donation. The average was $118,172, which fell between ranks 9 and 10. This is the average total amount donated by an ASX-listed company over the three years studied. Table E is identical in form to Tables C and D, except that it is confined to each party in turn. The pattern of ranking for donors to the Liberal Party, in terms of both total industry sector donation and average contributions per sector, closely follows the figures for all parties combined. The ALP's total industry sector donations and average contributions per sector do not follow the overall figures as closely as the Liberal Party. Both sets of figures for the National Party are at great variance to the overall figures. These figures show clearly that the Liberal Party was the most strongly supported party by ASX-listed companies. Table F shows the Top 10 ASX-listed company donors. The companies have been ranked in terms of total disclosable political donations made over the three-year period studied. Donations made to all political parties have been combined. Only Westpac and Village Roadshow donated more than $1 million during the three years. 120 Among the Top 10 donors, two made donations to all four major parties (Liberal, ALP, National and Australian Democrats); five made donations to three parties (Liberal, _____________________________________________________________________________________ 120 But note that the total for National Australia Bank would also have been over a million dollars if a disputed amount of $1 million had been counted in our study. The Liberal Party's return for 1996/97 did not show an amount for the transaction described below. However, in a letter to the Australian Electoral Commission, dated 30 July 1998, and on the Commission's public database, the Liberal Party requested that its 1996/97 return be amended to include a $1 million receipt from National Australia Bank. The letter explained: 'During the year ended 30 June 1997, as part of the Party's bank overdraft facilities with the National Australia Bank, a commercial bill of $1 million was credited to our bank account. This amount was not shown as a receipt in the Party's 1996/1997 Annual Return on the basis that it was a component of the overdraft. Overdrafts are not discloseable as receipts, but rather as debts if owed at year-end, and in our view, the same approach should apply to the commercial bill, particularly when it is part of an overall bank overdraft arrangement. This approach was verbally agreed with an officer of the Commission on 20 October 1997, prior to lodgement of the return, but subsequently reversed by another officer during the conduct of the audit.'
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C.
Analysis The Liberal Party consistently outperformed the other parties in terms of attracting corporate donations. So consistent, in fact, and so successful that in each year of the study, over the three-year period in aggregate, and in each corporate category, the Liberal Party's donations amounted to more than those of the other parties combined.
With respect to ASX-listed companies, the Liberal Party was able to achieve similarly dominant results for all industry sectors except Engineering, from which it received a few thousand dollars less than the ALP over the three years of the study. The Liberal Party was also able to attract donations from every industry sector except Chemicals, from which there were no disclosed donations at all.
In total, the level of donations could be said to be financially immaterial from the perspective of the corporate sector. About $29 million in total was donated by corporations to political parties over the three years of the study, which is not a large amount of money compared to the value of the corporate sector. Confining the analysis for the moment to public companies, the three-year figure of $17 million seems even less significant when contrasted with the multi-billion-dollar market capitalisation of ASX-listed companies. 121 Although the figures have not been tested for company size, the data intuitively confirms the findings of US studies that, other things being equal, large companies tend to make larger donations than small companies. 122 One thing, though, is certain: the data do not allow us to gauge the effect of the donations. Whether the donations have assisted the commercial aspirations of the donors is entirely speculative.
A possible conclusion is that the level of donations is hardly cause for concern. But before this conclusion may be made it is important to consider three factors. First, although the figure of $29 million over three years seems relatively small in contrast to the value of the corporate sector, it would be considered a much more significant sum when compared to the budget of the political parties. From the public policy perspective, a key issue is how much leverage a company (or companies) obtains as a result of political donations. This is more a factor of the importance of the donation to the political party than the relative size of the donation compared to the company's own value.
Second, from the corporate perspective, it is important that decisions to donate public company funds to political parties are subject to some checks and balances. Typically, these decisions will be made by the board of directors or a senior executive, but the money being donated is not theirs. As a matter of company law it is the
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205 ____________________________________________________________________________________ company's money -and as a matter of substance it is the shareholders' money; it is not the directors' money.
Third, for the period of the study (1995/96-1997/98) , there were readily available means to circumvent the existing disclosure provisions. The real level of corporate political 'support' would be revealed to be considerably higher if (i) donations made indirectly via clubs, trusts and foundations, and (ii) gifts-in-kind were to be added to the disclosed gifts in money. Indeed, the real level of corporate political support could be several times higher than the figures reported above. It is simply not possible to say because of the inadequate disclosure requirements that operated during the period of the study. The 1999 amendments to the Electoral Act, outlined in Section IVB above, should operate to improve disclosure. However, further reform is needed, as recommended in the next section.
VI. OPTIONS FOR REFORM
A. Background Shareholders' current powers in relation to political donations are very limited. 123 In its recent consultative paper concerning regulation of corporate political donations in the UK, the DTI summarised the current options for a company's shareholders seeking to prevent the directors from making political donations: The first option is, as already discussed, 125 of limited applicability in Australia because the doctrine of ultra vires with respect to companies has been abolished. The second option, concerning directors' and officers' duties, has been considered earlier in this article. The DTI paper considered a shareholder lawsuit over a political donation an unlikely event given the courts' traditional reluctance to review the merits of business decisions made by the board, 126 and the limited circumstances in which a shareholder may bring an action for breach of directors' duties. 127 A similar view was expressed earlier in this article, in relation to Australia.
The third option is unlike the first two options, which are reactive in nature. The DTI's main concern with the third option was the unlikelihood that there would be widespread adoption of such a clause in companies' constitutions. History shows that changes to company constitutions are normally board/management-initiated. In widely-held listed companies, it would be very rare for a shareholder-sponsored _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ proposal for a change to the constitution -which did not enjoy board and management support -to be successful. 128 In summary, the options currently available for shareholders of large companies to place checks and balances on their companies' political donations are very limited. But several interested parties -including a UK parliamentary committee, 129 the UK government, 130 an Australian political party 131 and shareholder advisory firms 132 -have concluded that leaving the matter of political donations mainly to the directors' discretion gives rise to an accountability problem. Specifically, it is not clear whether a particular donation has been made to serve primarily the interests of the company, or one or more of the company's directors. Reforms have been sought that would provide shareholders and the public generally with greater confidence that, when a company makes a donation to a political party, it is doing so because the donation is demonstrably in the company's interest. 133
B.
A statutory requirement for prior shareholder approval
The Australian Democrats proposals and UK government legislative changes As mentioned earlier, the Australian Democrats have proposed that public companies be required to obtain shareholder approval for their 'donation policies'. 134 A similar -but more detailed -proposal was made by the UK Neill Committee. The Committee recommended a change to the Companies Act 1985 (UK) to require prior shareholder authority as a pre-condition to a company making political donations. The specific nature of the reform suggested by the Committee involves:
• shareholders voting by ordinary resolution to give the directors a broad enabling authority to exercise discretion in making donations; • the authority would be subject to renewal at every fourth annual general meeting; • the authority would state a limit on the total amount available for political donations over the four years; • 'political donation' would be defined very broadly; and • donations made by a subsidiary would be permissible only if both the subsidiary's shareholder(s) and the shareholders of its holding company had given prior approval. 135 
Political Donations by Australian Companies
Recommendation
A shareholder-approval provision of the kind recently enacted in the UK should be introduced into the Australian Corporations Act. There are three factors which, taken in combination, support this recommendation.
First, when a company's board (or a senior executive) authorises a political donation out of company funds, the money donated -or other benefit provided -does not come from the directors' own funds. The benefit is provided by the company. In an economic sense the benefit is provided by the company's shareholders.
Second, a decision to make a political donation will in many cases be materially different from other 'business' decisions made by a large company's board and senior management. The benefit to the company from the donation will in many cases be at best extremely indirect and of uncertain magnitude. 136 However well-intentioned, any benefit to the company from this form of 'investment' is often going to be far more speculative than is the case with other investment decisions made by the board and senior management.
Third, it is reasonable to assume that a component of management self-interest accompanies many corporate political donations. But the options currently available for shareholders of large companies to place checks and balances on their companies' political donations are very limited. Therefore, it is likely that many political donations made by public companies entail agency costs.
Accordingly, imposing an appropriately designed shareholder-approval requirement can be viewed as a justifiable form of regulatory intervention. The likely benefits of an appropriately designed rule would probably outweigh the likely costs. A key benefit would flow from reducing the agency costs that accompany those donations that are motivated largely by management self-interest. The major cost would probably be the management time spent justifying the proposed shareholder resolution. 137 Appropriate design of the rule entails, among other things, recognising that:
• The benefit from reducing agency costs would be tangible only in mediumsized and large companies -particularly widely-held public companies. This is because, in many proprietary companies, there is significant overlap between the people who manage the company's business and the people who own the company's shares.
• Obtaining shareholder approval can be an expensive process for large listed companies.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 136 We are not referring here to donations that are intended to influence a government tender, or in some other way confer a direct financial benefit on the company. Rather, we are referring to the presumably (hopefully) more common variety: where the board is supporting a particular political party due to a commonality of view over major long-term policy issues. 137 Shareholders must be given adequate disclosure about matters on which they are asked to vote: Corporations Act, s 249L(b); Bulfin v Bebarfalds Ltd (1938) 38 SR NSW 423, 440; Chequepoint Securities Ltd v Claremont Petroleum NL (1986) 11 ACLR 94, 96-7; Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd (1995) 15 ACSR 590.
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The first point indicates that the rule should be confined to public companies. But to stop circumvention, the rule should be drafted sufficiently widely to catch benefits provided by subsidiaries or other controlled entities of a public company.
The second point explains why, under the recent UK changes, approval and subsequent 'renewals' would be spaced four years apart. Of more importance, though, the political donations matter could be added to the agenda for the annual general meeting -a shareholder meeting which all public companies must hold in any event. 138 This suggests that the expense attributable to a new shareholder-approval rule is unlikely to be great. As indicated, it would consist largely of management time spent justifying the proposed resolution granting donation-making power to the board.
C.
Improved disclosure rules The recent UK legislation referred to above provides for a broad definition of a political donation to a registered political party. It means:
• any gift to the party of money or other property;
• any sponsorship provided in relation to the party;
• any subscription or other fee paid for affiliation to, or membership of, the party;
• any money spent (otherwise than by or on behalf of the party) in paying any expenses incurred directly or indirectly by the party; • any money lent to the party otherwise than on commercial terms; and • the provision otherwise than on commercial terms of any property, services or facilities for the use or benefit of the party (including the services of any person). 139 The Australian Democrats have proposed that public companies be required to make 'full donations disclosure' in their annual report of donations to political parties. 140 The proposal appears to mirror the UK position. That is, it seems to be intended to catch all forms of benefit or 'support' provided by public companies to political parties. Presumably, the Democrats intend the rule to catch:
• support provided not only by the public company but also by any subsidiary or controlled entity of the public company; and • support provided not only directly to political parties but also indirectly to organisations (clubs, trusts, foundations, etc) that support political parties. The Australian Democrats' proposals provide support for the shareholder-approval rule proposed above. The information produced under a comprehensive disclosure rule would enable shareholders, when considering whether to empower the board to make political donations for the next four years, to make their decision with detailed knowledge of the way in which company funds had been donated in the previous four-year period. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Corporate political donations are of interest for several reasons including:
• a concern that commercial interests can be advanced by donating funds to political parties; and • in the case of public companies, that the funds being donated are not those of the directors of the company who make the decision to donate the funds but are the funds of the company's shareholders. In order to ascertain the extent of corporate political donations, the authors conducted a study, the data for which was derived from the annual returns of the major political parties lodged with the Australian Electoral Commission for 1995/96, 1996/97 and 1997/98. Over this three year period, total corporate donations were $29 million. Of this amount:
• 64% was donated to the Liberal Party while 23% was donated to the ALP;
• over $17 million was donated by public companies (with 63% of this going to the Liberal Party and 29% to the ALP); and • more than $11.5 million was donated by private companies (with 65% of this going to the Liberal Party and 15.5% to the ALP). In Australia, concerns have been expressed about inadequate disclosure requirements for political donations. The Electoral Act requires disclosure of political donations. However, disclosure under this Act is inadequate because it does not require disclosure of 'financial benefits' other than donations and loans made to political parties. For example, it may not catch a bank forgiving a loan made to a political party. In 2000 the Australian Democrats outlined reform proposals:
• to require shareholder approval of 'donation policies' of public companies (this mirrors the recent amendments to the Companies Act 1985 (UK) to require that any company wishing to make a donation to a political party in the UK must obtain the prior approval of its shareholders); and • to require 'full donations disclosure' in a public company's annual report. These reforms should be supported. 
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